The Social history of soldiers and veterans in United States history covers the role of soldiers in the United States from colonial foundations to the present, with emphasis on the social, cultural, economic and political roles apart from strictly military functions.

The colonial militia were primarily justified in terms of nearby threats by hostile Indians or foreign powers. Thed fear of slave revolts grew ominous in the South. In political crises, militia were sometimes used for a coup d'état, as in Boston in 1689. If they disagreed with their government's policy, they might refuse a summons as happened in Boston in 1747. The first large-scale use to deal with a natural disaster came with the devastating fire in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1802.

The militia played a crucial role in the New England Colonies, especially in Massachusetts and Connecticut. They served as the primary line of defense and community organization. The Massachusetts Bay Colony established its militia system in the early 1630s, modeled after the traditional English militia system. Service in the militia was compulsory for nearly all able-bodied white men between 16 and 60 living in the town. They were required to join the local militia, and provide their own weapons and uniforms. A hierarchical command structure was established, with a Sergeant Major General overseeing the entire colony's militia, but in practice the local town officials controlled its militia. The men elected their own officers, typically choosing leading citizens with minimal military experience. Drills were infrequent, usually amounting to a few days a year. When they were needed to defend the town, a subset of paid volunteers was used for a specific mission for a specified number of months. When The entire body of militia was called out, a man could avoid duty by paying a fine or providing a substitute. For the most part, militias on active duty contained officers from the local elite, and privates from the poorest sector who needed the pay. Few or none had prior military experience or advanced training.^[1][2]

Wars and raids were frequent in the colonial era, involving the nearby outposts of the French or Spanish empires, or hostile Indian tribes. The French often used Indian allies to raid outlying towns in New England. The militia was responsible for defending against attacks by the French and their Native Americans allies, as well as by independent Indian tribes. The militia often used their own Indian allies. The militia and their allies played the central role in the destruction of the Pequot Indians in the Pequot War of 1636–1638, as well as victory in the hard-fought King Philip's War of 1675–1676.^[3]

In the 18th century the British Army fought the French Army in a series of major European wars, especially the French and Indian War of 1754–1763. Important battles took place in North America that ended in expelling the French from North America. American militia played ancillary roles, but were often ridiculed by British officers as hopelessly undisciplined amateurs who lacked respect for authority.^[4][5]

In the late 1680s Governor Edmund Andros, representing King James II and the Catholic faction in power in London, consolidated the northern colonies into the Dominion of New England. He thus stripped away much of the power of colonial governments in New England, New York, and the two Jersey colonies. The elites were angry at their loss of control. When rumor arrived in April 1689 of the king's overthrow, local forces in Boston used the militia to overthrow Andros and his regular army troops. No shots were fired; no one was killed or injured. Bostonians long celebrated their use of the militia to overthrow unlawful attempts to challenge their historic right of self-government.^[6]

In November, 1747, Admiral Charles Knowles of the Royal Navy made port in Boston on the way to action against France in the Caribbean during the War of the Austrian Succession. His crews were shorthanded and he sent in a press gang to seize likely sailors regardless of their status. A mob of 300 sailors assembled to block the press gang; it escalated into a three-day riot. Governor William Shirley called for calm, but he represented British authority and he was chased by the mob to the safety of Castle William. The governor called out the militia, but only 20 men responded: Boston's militiamen were refusing to obey the order of the king's governor to help impress sailors for the king's fleet in wartime. Admiral Knowles prepared to bombard the city. Shirley managed to convince him to release some of the impressed men and the mob dispersed. Knowles finally sailed off, ending the most serious challenge against imperial authority in the American colonies to take place before the Stamp Act crisis.^[7][8][9]

As threats evolved, so did the militia system. In the 1770s, some towns created elite "minutemen" companies that trained more intensely and could respond rapidly to British threats.^[10] The minutemen played a crucial role in the early stages of the American Revolution, particularly at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. British spies had reported that two top Patriots were in Lexington and that large stores of munitions were in Concord. The British decided to send a midnight march by 900 elite troops to neutralize the threat. The Massachusetts Provincial Congress had ordered all towns to activate and train their militias, and prepare for action. Around Boston the Minutemen had built a large network of informants focused on quick reaction. Patriot spies somehow learned of the plan and before midnight on April 18 Paul Revere and 40 others were spreading the alarm. At least 80 militia companies were involved with about 4000 soldiers. Dozens of towns rang church bells and mobilized for battle. The British did not find leaders at Lexington or munition at Concord. At noon they started back encountering time and again ambushes from about a thousand militia riflemen firing from about 100 yards. At last a relief column rescued them but not before a third became casualties, including nearly half the officers.^[11]

In Britain, religious tensions flared between King James II, a Catholic, and the anti-Catholics who led the Glorious Revolution and installed William and Mary. When rumors reached New York in 1689, the anti-Catholic Yankees on Long Island were energized, and at one point sent their militia units on a march to the city to oust the pro-Catholic element. They turned back, however, and there were no episodes of rival militias fighting for political power. Soon a prominent businessman Jacob Leisler used the militia unit he controlled to seize power, and proclaim himself lieutenant governor awaiting the new governor to be appointed by the new monarchs. He ruled for two years. London finally sent in a new governor whom Leisler refused to recognize. Tensions mounted, with Leisler's militia confronting the king's forces. There was no fighting. Leisler finally gave in. He was arrested, found guilty of treason, and punished by the most gruesome method known: he was Hanged, drawn and quartered.^[12]

In the South, large-scale plantation agriculture dominated the coastal regions of Virginia and South Carolina, with heavy majorities of enslaved people. Fear of slave rebellion wasa major factor, although there were only a few relatively small revolts. Further actually broke out. Inland the economy was based on small white-owned farms, with a risk of conflict with Native Americans. The entire South had few cities, apart from Baltimore and Charleston.^[13]

Part of a series on
North American slave revolts
Attack and capture of the Crête-à-Pierrot (Combat et prise de la Crête-à-Pierrot, March 1802) in the Haitian Revolution by Auguste Raffet, engraving by Ernest Hébert
Context Atlantic slave trade Maroons Slavery among indigenous peoples Slavery in Canada Cuba Haiti Latin America Bahamas New France New Spain British and French Caribbean British Virgin Islands United States colonial US
Before 1700 1521 Santo Domingo Slave Revolt (Santo Domingo) 1526 San Miguel de Gualdape (Spanish Florida, victorious) 1548–1558, 1579–1582 Bayano Wars (Real Audiencia of Panama, New Spain, suppressed) c. 1570 Gaspar Yanga's Revolt (Veracruz, New Spain, victorious) 1601 Acaxee Rebellion (New Spain, suppressed) 1616 Tepehuán Revolt (New Spain, suppressed) 1680 Pueblo Revolt (Santa Fe de Nuevo México, New Spain, victorious)
18th century 1712 New York Slave Revolt (British Province of New York, suppressed) 1730 First Maroon War (British Jamaica, victorious) 1730 Chesapeake rebellion (British Chesapeake Colonies, suppressed) 1731 Samba rebellion (Louisiana, New France, suppressed) 1733 St. John Slave Revolt (Danish Saint John, suppressed) 1739 Stono Rebellion (British Province of South Carolina, suppressed) 1741 New York Conspiracy (British Province of New York, suppressed) 1760–61 Tacky's Revolt (British Jamaica, suppressed) 1768 Montserrat slave rebellion (British Montserrat, suppressed) 1787 Abaco Slave Revolt (British Bahamas, suppressed) 1791 Mina Conspiracy (Louisiana, New Spain, suppressed) 1795 Pointe Coupée Conspiracy (Louisiana, New Spain, suppressed) 1795 Curaçao Slave Revolt of 1795 (Dutch Curaçao, suppressed) 1791–1804 Haitian Revolution (French Saint-Domingue, victorious)
19th century 1800 Gabriel's Rebellion (Virginia, suppressed) 1803 Igbo Landing (St. Simons Island, Georgia, victorious) 1805 Chatham Manor (Virginia, suppressed) 1811 German Coast Uprising (Territory of Orleans, suppressed) 1811 Aponte conspiracy (Spanish Cuba, suppressed) 1815 George Boxley (Virginia, suppressed) 1816 Bussa's Rebellion (British Barbados, suppressed) 1822 Vesey Plot (South Carolina, suppressed) 1825 Great African Slave Revolt (Cuba, suppressed) 1831 Nat Turner's rebellion (Virginia, suppressed) 1831–32 Baptist War (British Jamaica, suppressed) 1839 Amistad, ship rebellion (off the Cuban coast, victorious) 1841 Creole case, ship rebellion (off the Southern U.S. coast, victorious) 1842 slave revolt in the Cherokee Nation (Indian Territory, suppressed) 1843–44 Ladder Conspiracy (Spanish Cuba, suppressed) 1849 Charleston Workhouse Slave Rebellion (South Carolina, suppressed) 1859 John Brown's raid (Virginia, suppressed)
Notable leaders Carolta Charles Deslondes Denmark Vesey François Mackandal Gabriel Prosser Gaspar Yanga Jean Saint Malo Jean-Jacques Dessalines John Brown Joseph Cinqué Madison Washington Marcos Xiorro Maria Nanny of the Maroons Nat Turner Toussaint Louverture Tula
v t e

Bacon's Rebellion was an armed rebellion by Virginia settlers in their militia units that took place from 1676 to 1677. It was led by Nathaniel Bacon against Governor William Berkeley, after Berkeley refused Bacon's request to drive Indians out of Virginia.^[14] Thousands of Virginians from races and all classes (including those in indentured servitude) rose up in arms against Berkeley, chasing him from Jamestown and ultimately torching the settlement. The rebellion was first suppressed by a few armed merchant ships from London whose captains sided with Berkeley.^[15] Bacon died of disease in October, 1676, and John Ingram took control of the rebel militias. More forces arrived from England and Governor Berkeley won out. He hanged 23 rebels. The next governor began reforms.^[16]

On 9 September 1739, an enslaved man named Jemmy gathered 22 enslaved Africans near the Stono River, 20 miles (30 km) southwest of Charleston. South Carolina. They marched down the roadway with a banner that read "Liberty!", and chanted the same word. They raided a store at the Stono River Bridge, killing two storekeepers and seizing weapons and ammunition. Raising a flag, the marchers proceeded south toward Spanish Florida, an unsettled area that was a refuge for individual escapees. On the way, they gathered more recruits, sometimes reluctant ones, for a total of 81. They burned six plantations and killed 23 to 28 whites along the way. The alarm was raised and the local militia rushed to confront the rebels. About a hundred well-armed mounted men caught them at the Edisto River. In the ensuing battle, 23 whites and 47 slaves were killed. The following week several additional militia units arrived on the scene. Small groups and individuals who had had escaped were tracked down and shot. The government executed most of the rebels who surrendered, and sold the rest in the West Indies. White colonists up and down the South never forgot the episode, and kept the militia in good order to suppress any kind of repetition. For the next century and more even the smallest rumor or suspicious fire would incite a quick investigation of a supposed conspiracy, but few actual plots were discovered.^[17][18]

Historian John Shy argues:^[19]

Most Americans after 1776 avoided the most arduous and hazardous form of military service, even as they expressed their belief that the goal of an independent republic demanded the burden of its creation being shared fairly among its citizens. Soldiers of the Continental Army were angry at being neglected by citizens and politicians who declined to do more to reinforce, pay, and supply them. Despite the agricultural riches and large population of the American colonies, the army never had the numbers or the financial and logistical support it so desperately needed.

Shy estimates that 150,000 to 200,000 Americans served in the Revolution, about one in every ten men who were white and not loyal to the King. About 25,000 died and perhaps 25,000 came home crippled. After the first wave of enthusiasm, enlisted men were drawn largely from the poorer classes.^[20] John Ruddiman argues that universal service in the peacetime militia meant that all young white men knew that everyone could see them in adult company with men of all levels of local society. It validated their manliness and their maturity. Volunteering for the Continental Army, however, was a different experience because it recruited from lower ranks of society. The recruits were surrounded by strangers of about the same age, who on the whole were younger, poorer, and more marginal than most adults. Drilling was far more intense and frequent, and it was not for show but for survival. As veterans their post-war status tended to reflect how they started with less and never caught up, despite their aspirations to "Becoming Men of Some Consequence."^[21][22]

African Americans, both as slaves and freemen, served on both sides. About 9,000 black soldiers served on the American side, counting the Continental Army and Navy, state militia units, as well as privateers, wagoneers in the Army, servants, officers and spies.^[23] Ray Raphael notes that while thousands did join the Loyalist cause, "A far larger number, free as well as slave, tried to further their interests by siding with the patriots."^[24]

Black soldiers served in Northern militias from the outset, but this was forbidden in the South, where slave-owners feared arming slaves. Lord Dunmore, the Royal Governor of Virginia, issued a proclamation in November 1775, promising freedom to runaway slaves who fought for the British. From 800 to 2,000 slaves took up the invitation. The only notable battle in which Dunmore's regiment participated was the Battle of Great Bridge in Virginia in December 1775, which was a decisive British loss.^[25] Dunmore's strategy was ultimately unsuccessful as the Black troops were decimated by smallpox.^[26]

Many of the Black Loyalists performed military service in the British Army, particularly as part of the only Black regiment of the war, the Black Pioneers, and others served non-military roles.^[27] After the war many Black Loyalist migrated to Nova Scotia and later to Sierra Leone; others went to Britain.^[28]

In response to Dunmore's proclamation, Washington lifted the ban on black enlistment in the Continental Army in January 1776. All-black units were formed in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. They included slaves promised freedom for serving as replacements when their masters were drafted.^[29][30]

New York City, Philadelphia in 1777, and Charleston, South Carolina, were the major cites the British used to hold American prisoners of war. Facilities were harsh. Edwsrd Burrows estimates that the British captured over 30,000 Americans, and that about 17,500 died in captivity, compared to 6,800 who died in battle.^[31] During the war, at least 16 hulks, including the infamous HMS Jersey, were used in the waters of Wallabout Bay off the shores of Brooklyn, New York, as a place of incarceration. The prisoners were harassed and abused by guards who, with little success, offered release to those who agreed to serve in the British Navy. Over 10,000 American prisoners died there.^[32][33][34]

During the Revolutionary War, militia units supporting independence (Patriots or Whigs) sometimes fought against militia units loyal to the Crown (Loyalists or Tories). Conflict was particularly intense in North Carolina after 1781, when the main British and Continental armies left the state. The resulting "Tory War" was a vicious struggle between local militia factions.^[35]

In New York City and western Long Island, with 50,000 Loyalist refugees, the British set up new militia units with 16,000 men. They did not fight the Patriot forces.^[36]

The combat phase of the Revolution ended in 1781 with an American victory but the peacemaking process took anothe two years. Meanwhile, Congress and the states were practically insolvent and were far behind in paying the troops of the Continental Army. The growing anger resulted in two attempted mutinies. Washington himself quelled the one threatened by senior officers in the Newburgh Conspiracy in March 1783. In June 1783 some 300 enlisted men, without their officers, marched on Congress in Philadelphia demanding back pay. Promises were made and there was no violence. However Congress quickly left Philadelphia and reopened in the small college town of Princeton, New Jersey. Robert Morris, in charge of finances, faced a complex of issues, according to Kenneth R. Bowling:

The settlement involved the different laws and procedures of the states, Congress, and various departments within the Army. In addition to back pay and cash bounties, the government of the United States and the several states had to consider tax free land titles, clothing allowances, and other rations in the computations. Each soldier needed to be treated individually because the accounts varied enormously. Morris knew they would take years to settle, and he held to his position adamantly, pointing out that the longer the Army was retained, the less likely it would be to go home peacefully.^[37]

A massive regional insurrection took place in Western Massachusetts as embittered farmers and small town businessmen were badly indebted by statewide taxation, banking, and economic policies imposed from Boston.^[38] Their repeated demands for relief were ignored by the state legislature. Local leaders called themselves "Regulators," mobilized the militias, and systematically shut down the entire court system in the western half of the state. The Boston elite counter-mobilized. The national government was too weak to help in any way, so the governor his allies called out the militia units from eastern Massachusetts, and Boston bankers funded a new private militia. They marched west to a showdown. On both sides, nearly all the of the officers and most of the men were veterans of the Revolutionary War. The Regulators had typically been in the militia rather than the Continental army. The Regulator leadership by Daniel Shays and Luke Day proved very poor, with a lack of planning and confused decisions in combat. By contrast, leadership challenges were well handled by the government troops. In the decisive confrontation in January, 1787, three separate insurgent militia groups of about 1200 men each were badly coordinated in an attack on the state arsenal in Springfield. At the first counterattack, the men broke and ran. State forces quickly forced the insurgents to surrender or go into exile. Most were pardoned and some economic reforms were made. The episode was used by national leaders to call for a new constitution for a national government that could be capable of handling future large scale insurgency.^[39][40][41]

In the New York and Pennsylvania conventions that ratified the proposed new Constitution in 1788, delegates who had served in the militia tended to be Anti-Federalists and opposed ratification, while delegates who served in the Continental Army favored the new constitution. Historian Edwin G Burrows argues this represents a cleavage between the “localist” elites and the “cosmopolitan” elites in the same community. Anti-Federalists were hostile to having their local defense forces shifted elsewhere even temporarily. Federalists on the other hand saw the way to unite the new nation was to have men from every state mingling together in the national army.^[42]

The first (and only) major veterans organization was the Society of the Cincinnati, formed in 1783. It was open to officers of the Continental Army and their eldest son, but not to militia officers. It became highly controversial, sparking allegations that it was a hereditary elite group that would create a new aristocracy to overwhelm republicanism. Its president was George Washington, but he tried and failed to remove the objectional features. He became inactive and the Society became an inconspicuous social club; it still exists.^[43]

The professional U.S. Army started with 6,500 men and grew to 50,000. The British started with 5,000 troops in Canada and ended with 26,000. The U.S. depended mostly on the state militias, where 398,000 served for less than six months and another 60,000 for somewhat longer terms.^[44] The militiamen carried their own long rifles while the British typically carried less accurate muskets. Congress and the governing Democrtic-Republican Party was hostile to a standing army but put its trust in the state militia for ideological reasons unrelated to the needs of fighting a major war. Consequently Leadership was inconsistent in the professional officer corps --some proved themselves to be outstanding, but many others were inept, owing their positions to political favours. The officer corps was amateurish--only the youngest of them had graduated from West Point and the creation of a professional corps would take another two decades.^[45]

Washington depended on the state militias to fight the war, but New England governors (except Vermont) refused to send them.^[46] The militias were poorly trained, poorly armed, and badly led by local politicians.^[47] The British Army soundly defeated the Maryland and Virginia militias at the Battle of Bladensburg in 1814 and President James Madison commented "I could never have believed so great a difference existed between regular troops and a militia force, if I had not witnessed the scenes of this day".^[48]

The British Royal Navy captured numerous American warships, and held 14,000 sailors and marines captive. Conditions were much more humane than in the 1770s.^[49]

The traditional militia system largely died out after 1815. It survived in the Black Belt districts of the Deep South. There the slave population outnumbered the white population often by margins of 2-1 or 3-1 or higher. Whites feared slave revolts, though only one of any size broke out. The Nat Turner's Rebellion in Virginia in 1831 killed about 60 whites. It was suppressed by the militia in two days.^[50] In some frontier areas, where the regular Army was in charge of Indian affairs, local militia drills took place, just in case.^[51] In most places across the nation the traditional militia became a social club with jovial meetings and no real military drilling. A new phenomenon emerged: private military clubs, usually based on ethnic, religious or cultural camaraderie. Members bought their own elaborate uniforms and weapons, prided themselves in drill formations, and played a role in local politics.^[52] The Mormons, a fast-growing religious body with many enemies, organized its men into private militia companies for self defense. The most famous included the Nauvoo Legion in Illinois in 1841–1844 and the Utah Territorial Militia in 1847–1887.^[53][54]

There were striking resemblances between the Mexican War and the Civil War from the soldiers' perspective. The men who volunteered in 1861 were similar to the men of 1846 in terms of how recruitment worked, their ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and their organization into friendly social relationships like the old militias, rather than the rigidity of the peacetime army. One major difference was that the 1846 cohort rarely saw defeat or capture, while that was far more common in the 1860s.^[55] A total of 101,000 American soldiers were mobilized, including 27,000 regulars and 74,000 volunteers; the typical volunteer served for 10 months. Deaths in battle totaled 1,549; another 11,000 died from disease and accident. Mexican losses were much higher but accurate data is lacking. The Civil War death rates were much higher.^[56]

As regimental commanders, volunteer colonels were vital to American military efforts, raising units of volunteer soldiers who agreed to serve outside US boundaries. The came from western states, especially Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi. Of the 63 volunteer colonels on active duty in 1846, 14 belonged to the Whig Party, indicating that Whigs were not monolithic in their opposition to the war. The colonels accumulated a mixed wartime record of leadership, and their backgrounds varied greatly. Some had no military experience prior to 1846, but others had graduated from West Point, served in the regular army, seen combat in war or on the frontier, or held rank in a state militia. The colonels also varied widely in holding political office before and after the war. Several of them were experienced politicians before 1846 who also held important offices after the war, showing that most colonels were recognized figures in their home states.^[57]

According to historian Kevin Dougherty, many of the senior commanders on both sides of the American Civil War, including Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant, gained their most useful military experience in this war. Most helpful to Grant was the insight he gained about the rival Confederate generals he faced, explaining "The Mexican War made the officers of the old regular armies more or less acquainted, and when we knew the name of the general opposing we knew enough about him to make our plans accordingly. What determined my attack on Fort Donelson was as much the knowledge I had gained of its commanders in Mexico as anything else."^[58] Lee was impressed by the quick payoff of intelligent reconnaissance and the power of a swift-striking flanking movement. Throughout the Civil War, Lee insisted on thorough reconnaissance. Lee's flanking movement at Chancellorsville echoed Winfield Scott's at Cerro Gordo. George B. McClellan learned the value of sieges, such as the one Scott imposed on Vera Cruz. Stonewall Jackson applied his observations of swift-striking flanking movements in his Shenandoah Valley campaign, and at Chancellorsville. Samuel Francis Du Pont learned how to blockade Mexican ports, which he applied in his blockade of Confederate ports. Joseph Hooker used his experience in military management to reorganize the Union armies before Chancellorsville in 1863.^[59]

• Colonial American military history
  • Bacon's Rebellion, in 1676
  • Minutemen
  • Provincial troops in the French and Indian Wars
  • Loyalists fighting in the American Revolution
• Conscription in the United States
• History of the United States Army
  • • National Guard (United States)
    • List of incidents of civil unrest in the United States
• Military history of African Americans
  • African Americans in the American Civil War
• Foreign enlistment in the American Civil War
  • German Americans in the American Civil War
  • Hispanics in the American Civil War
  • Irish Americans in the American Civil War
  • Italian Americans in the Civil War
  • Native Americans in the American Civil War
• Greatest Generation the cohort born 1901 to 1927, including most of the soldiers of World War II
  • American women in World War II#In the military
  • Hispanic Americans in World War II
  • Japanese-American service in World War II
  • Native Americans and World War II
• Veteran's pension

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• Mahon, John K. History of the Militia and the National Guard (Macmillan. 1983), scholarly history
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• Prucha, Francis Paul. Broadax and bayonet: the role of the United States Army in the development of the northwest, 1815-1860 (1953) online

• Radabaugh, Jack S. "The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts" Military Affairs 18#1 (1954), pp. 1–18. online
• Resch, John. Suffering soldiers: Revolutionary War veterans, moral sentiment, and political culture in the early republic (U Massachusetts Press, 1999) online
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